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Can They Occur in an Instant?
In the case of State v. Cates' which was followed by State v.
Palen,' the Supreme Court of Montana held, in effect, that pre-
meditation and deliberation, as requisites of first degree murder,
could be formed in the instant before the fatal act was consum-
mated. It would appear that the purport of this decision is to
eliminate the distinction between murder in the first degree and
murder in the second degree.
The Montana legislature defined murder as: "the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought. "S This is a
restatement of the common law definition.' But, whereas, at the
common law there was only one degree of murder the legislature
has provided two:
"Degrees of Murder: All murder which is perpetrated
by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any
other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
or which is committed in the perpetration or the attempt
to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem,
or perpetrated from a deliberate and premeditated design,
unlawfully and maliciously, to effect the death of any
human being other than him who is killed, is murder of
the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the
second degree." "
Our statute is patterned after that of the Pennsylvania
statute of 1794 which was the first of this type enacted in the
United States. The weight of authority in states having a
similar statute hold that premeditation and deliberation can
come into being in the instant or moment before the act is con-
summated.' The trend, however, is away from this view to-
1(1934) 97 Mont. 173, 33 P. (2d) 578.
2(1947) 119 Mont. 600, 178 P. (2d) 862.
3R.C.M., 1947, § 94-2501 (10953).
'BLACK. COM. IV, 195.5R.C.M., 1947, § 94-2503 (10955).6The Montana statute has the word "torture" added, following "lying
in wait." This is not included in the Pennsylvania statute. The his-
torical development of the Pennsylvania statute is thoroughly covered
in: Keedy, History of the Pennylvania Statute Creating Degrees of
Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 759 (1949).
'18 Am. Dec. 782 ff. In interpreting this type of statute the courts im-
mediately became involved in difficulties when they were faced with
the problem of determining precisely how much actual time premedita-
tion and deliberation required. As It was obviously impossible to lay
down a hard and fast rule which would require the passage of a given
number of minutes, the courts adopted the view that a very short time
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wards that of the minority which holds that the terms, "deliber-
ate and premeditated" must be given a judicial meaning which
is consistent with the actual meaning of these words: that
defining deliberate and premeditated in terms of "instant" or
"quick as successive thoughts" (a description frequently used)
suggests the absence rather than the presence of deliberateness
and premeditation. This trend is clearly enunciated by the
strong, definitive position taken by the Ninth Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals in the case of U.S. v. Jones," in which it was
stated:
"The words 'deliberate' and 'premeditated' are not such
words of art as to be without meaning to jurors. Left to
their own devices, with nothing but the language of the
statute to guide them, the jury might be able to appre-
ciate the essential difference between first and second de-
gree murder. But when the court, which might properly
advise the jury that no particular time is necessary, pro-
ceeds in terms which lay emphasis upon no appreciable
time, and 'instantaneous,' the statutory distinctions are
rendered meaningless. Deliberation and premeditation
were here defined in terms which suggest their absence."
would suffice and that the time could be as short as a moment or an
instant. Many of these decisions reveal inherent inconsistencies and
contradictions resulting from their attempts to give some meaning to
deliberate and premeditated in terms which denied the presence of
any deliberation and premeditation.
This is illustrated by the early Montana case of Territory v. John-
son (1889) 9 Mont. 21, 27, 22 P. 346 in which the judge said:
"... deliberation and premeditation need not be of any consider-
able length of time previous to the assault. It is enough ...
even though the act follow immediately upon the decision."
Use of the phrase "of any considerable length of time" implies the
passage of some appreciable length of time, albeit no great amount.
Whereas the use of "immediately" suggests instant, moment or of no
time. For a discussion of the earlier cases refer to 18 Am. Dec. 772 ff.
'People v. Sanchez (1864) 24 Cal. 17. This case has often been cited
and the above phrase often quoted, but later California cases have
repudiated it, e.g., People v. Hashaway (1945) 27 Cal. App. (2d) 554,
155 P. (2d) 823 and especially People v. Bender, (1945) 27 Cal. (2d)
164, 163 P. (2d) 8. The latter case expressly disapproves of the view
that the act of killing may follow the intention to kill as quickly as
successive thoughts of the mind, etc.
(1949) 175 F. (2d) 544 at p. 551. This decision was very ably presented
by Judge Pope, resident of Missoula, Montana and former Montana
practitioner.1 For other instances of reversal of the majority rule refer to footnotes
(8) sup'a and (24) infra. In the federal field, Bullock v. U.S. (1941)
74 App. D.C. 220, 122 F. (2d) 213, clearly repudiates the rule, formerly
held by that court, that premeditation and deliberation can occur in
an instant; refer also to Fisher v. U.S. (1945) 328 U.S. 463. In the
state field refer to: McClendon v. State (1939) 197 Ark. 1135, 126 S.W.
(2d) 928; Snipes v. State (1944) 154 Fla. 262, 17 So. (2d) 93; People
v. Woodley (1948) 78 N.Y.S. (2d) 284, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 130.
2
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This case must be considered as establishing strong persuasive
authority, especially for those states embraced by the Ninth
Federal Circuit.
Under our statutes the maximum penalty for second degree
murder (which is the same as the common law crime of murder)
is life imprisonment ;' whereas, the extreme penalty for the same
crime at common law was commonly execution.' This mitiga-
tion of the long accepted penalty for murder was in keeping
with the social trends of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The legislature did, however, see fit to provide the death sent-
ence for murder of a particular type. Looking to that portion
of the statute which is germane to this discussion we see that it
is murder, ". . . perpetrated . . . by any other kind of wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing. . . ." The death penalty
may be given as punishment only for those murders which are
thus differentiated from second degree murder.
We may properly infer that as the penalty is more severe,
the crime must be more reprehensible and more to be deplored
and prevented. Punishment is intended to act as a deterrent
and preventive of crime, as well as a means of reformation.1' It
follows therefore, that as an infinitely harsher and more severe
penalty is adopted, the crime to be prevented must be of a much
greater magnitude. If the crime of murder in the first degree
is of much greater magnitude than that of murder in the second
degree, the distinction between the two should be readily dis-
cernible. This distinction between the two types of murder was
noted by Plato about twenty-two centuries ago:
"He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not
immediately and at the moment, but with insidious de-
sign, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he
who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance
on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches
to the involuntary.... The best and truest view is to dis-
tingnish them accordingly as they are done with or with-
out premeditation. And we should make the penalties
heavier for those who commit homicide with angry pre-
meditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate,
but smite upon the instant.... '5
11R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2505 (10957).
"BLACK. COM. IV, p. 194.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2503 (10955).
"Mont. Const. Art III, § 25; HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, p. 46 (1881).
'DAwoGuEs OF PLATO, LAws IX (867) Jowmr's Translation. The ap-
parent failure of this standard which was first established by Plato,
caused the late Justice Cardozo to conclude that some criterion other
than premeditation and deliberation must be established for distin-
guishing between first and second degree murder. In an essay, What
3
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It will be necessary then, to examine carefully these ele-
ments which are under discussion. If we interpret the words of
the statute: "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated" in their lay
sense,' giving them the full import of their ordinary meaning
we have a criterion for establishing and determining the differ-
ence between first and second degree murder. Deliberate is de-
fined as:
(a) "Done with deliberation; formed, arrived at, or de-
termined upon as a result of careful thought... 3. Slow
in action; unhurried." (b) "deliberate implies full
awareness of the nature of what one says or does, and, in
very precise use, a careful and unhurried calculation of
the intended effect or of the probable consequences. "'
Medichiw Can Do For Law in LAW AND LIrATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS,
296 ff. (1931) he says:
"... The difficulty arises when we try to discover what is
meant by the words deliberate and premediated .... I think
the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law....
I think the students of the mind should make it clear to the law
makers that the statute is framed along the lines of a defective
and unreal psychology .... The present distinction is so obscure
that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected
to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I
understand it myself .... "
Quare: Did not Cardozo's difficulty stem from the fact that he ac-
cepted, without question, the majority view as: (a) the correct inter-
pretation of the meaning of premeditation and deliberation, or (b)
sacrosanct, being the view of the majority and as such beyond correc-
tion or revision? In my opinion these considerations are untenable.
As I have noted elsewhere in this article the majority interpretation is
clearly erroneous. Furthermore, our system of law has achieved its
fundamental vitality in part through Its capacity to correct its own
errors. Did Cardozo believe that Plato's standard of premeditation
and deliberation reflects a "defective and unreal psychology" which
could be rectified by the medical profession? It is highly debatable
whether or not the "students of the mind" are qualified to define a
wholly new standard. But if they were, and if such a new standard
were accepted a new crime would be established. And, society would
still have to cope with the planned murder which, for twenty-two hun-
dred years, has been considered as particularly heinous.
If Cardozo had faced the problem head-on as Judge Pope did in
People v. Jones (note 9 supra) the fundamental reason for the alleged
failure of the standard would have been revealed, i.e., the defining in-
jury instructions of premeditation and deliberation in terms which sug-
gest their absence.
I submit that the real distinction between the two types of murder
would be, to a large extent, clearly defined and the problem mitigated,
even though not solved unequivocally, if the views expressed in this
comment and in the cases cited in footnotes (9) and (10) supra, were
religiously applied by all the courts.
"Note the quotation from Judge Pope's decision on p. 2 8upra.
"(a) WEBSTmR's COLLEGIATE DIcTIONAuY, 5th Ed. p. 265. (b) WEBsTER's
DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS, p. 233.
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Wilful is defined as:
"adds to deliberate the implications of a refusal to be
taught, counseled, or commanded, and of an obstinate de-
termination to follow one's own will or choice in full con-
sciousness of the influences or arguments opposed to the
attitude adopted or the action or deed contemplated.' '
And, premeditate is defined as:
(a) "To consider or revolve in the mind beforehand; to
contrive design, or deliberate in advance of acting, speak-
ing, etc." and, (b) "Premeditated emphasizes forethought
and planning but often falls far short of deliberate in im-
plying careful calculation and awareness of consequ-
ences. ""
Applying these definitions' to the words as used in the statute,
there emerges the picture of the considered and planned homi-
cide, the mental weighing, the choosing of ways and means; the
prior conception followed by a consummation of the plan con-
ceived-all of which would seem to delineate the type of murde?
embraced by the statute.
It is of importance to note how the court in the subject case
dealt with this problem of distinguishing between first and sec-
ond degree murder where the defendant had been sentenced to
be hanged. On appeal the counsel for the defendant alleged
that the state had failed to sustain the burden of proving delib-
eration and premeditation, that the record was barren of any
proof of deliberation and premeditation. The court readily ad-
mitted the necessity of establishing these elements:
"Therefore, in order to sustain conviction of murder in
first degree, the burden rested upon the state to establish
not only the killing by the defendant, but also the presence
of deliberation and premeditation."'
The court disposed of the question in four steps:
FIRST: "Counsel assumes that there should be evidence
tending expressly to show the deliberate purpose; but this
is not necessary . . . It is generally to be inferred from
facts and circumstances attending the killing."''
-Id. (b) 877.
"Id. (a) 783; (b) 233.
"The court in People v. Bender, note 8 supra, specifically resorted to the
dictionary for definiton of these terms.2'Op. cit. note 1, at p. 201.
22M.
5
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SEcoND, quoting from the New Mexico case of State v. Rodri-
guez:"
"It is well settled that, if the intent to take life is ex-
ecuted after deliberation and premeditation, though but
for a moment or an instant, the crime may be murder in
the first degree."
At first glance this quotation may appear to be a clear statement
to the effect that premeditation and deliberation can occur in
an instant. However, on closer examination one may wonder
whether the phrase, "though but for a moment or an instant"
modifies the subordinating conjunction, "after" thereby describ-
ing how long after the deliberation and intent has been formed
that the intent need be executed. This construction renders a
meaning quite different from the one construed by our court.
It is at least fair to say that this citation is not a clear judicial
statement to the effect that premeditation and deliberation can
come into being in the instant or moment before the act is ex-
ecuted.
TaIRD, amplifying the 'moment or instant' doctrine the court
said:
"The purpose to kill may be formed the moment it is ex-
ecuted as well as for an hour or a day, and still the act
be premeditated. '
The ease of State v. Speyer" is cited in support of this state-
ment, which, although not in quotation marks, was apparently
taken from the Speyer case. Contrast the tenor of this sentence
with these remarks from the Speyer case which immediately fol-
low the sentence quoted in the original opinion of that case:
"In the absence of either constituent there can be no mur-
der in the first degree .... Deliberation is but prolonged
premeditation in a cool state of the blood .... Deliberation
is also premeditation but it is something more. It is not
only to think of beforehand, which may be but for an
231d.
" (1917) 23 N.M. 156, 167 P. 426, L.R.A. 1918A 1016. It is significant to
note that New Mexico has repudiated this view in the case of State v.
Torres (1935) 39 N.M. 191, 43 P. (2d) 929, in which the court said:
"The error in the Sanchez case was that the judge overlooked
the difference between premeditation and deliberation...
deliberation means thinking over with calm and reflective
mind. . ....
This latter view is also clearly expressed in State v. Hall (1936) 40
N.M. 128, 55 P. (2d) 740.
2Op. eit. note 21 &upra (italics added).
2(1907) 207 Mo. 540, 106 S.W. 505, 14 L.R.A. (N. S.) 836.
6
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instant, but the inclination to do the act is considered,
weighed, pondered upon for such a length of time after
provocation is given as the jury may find was sufficient
for the blood to cool ... it must necessarily follow that all
intentional homicides, committed with premeditation and
malice, but without deliberation, must be murder in the
second degree. The word 'deliberation' as used in the
statute ... is intended to characterize what are ordinarily
termed 'cold blood murders' such as proceed from deep
malignity of heart, or are prompted by motives of revenge
or gain."
The one sentence taken by our court obviously has a meaning
quite different from the more complete reading.'
FOURTH, and finally, as proof that deliberation was clearly evi-
dent (and presumably premeditation) in the facts of the Cates
case the Montana court said:
".. . the defendant testified that, when he shot, he shot
at the body of the deceased; that he knew where to hit
him. From these facts it appears that the defendant was




This seems to be a rather cavalier manner of disposing of de-
fendant's objection that the record was barren of any proof of
deliberation. The court's "deliberate design and purpose"
could be just as readily inferred from the fact that the defend-
ant, while standing at point blank range, did shoot the deceased
in the body. Here the court is identifying and confusing "de-
liberate" with intent to kill. The statement by the defendant
that he "knew where to hit him" does not add to the implica-
tion arising from his acts. The intent to kill or the malice which
may be implied by the circumstances of the case is not at all
synonymous with deliberate, meaning unhurried and careful cal-
culation of the intended effect or probable consequences; or
with premeditate, meaning, "forethought and planning."'
To say that an act can be premeditated or deliberated in an
2'd. (L.R.A) at p. 840.
'the court in the Speyer case reversed the trial court on another defec-
tive instruction and also on the grounds that the defendant was in-
sane, hence the excerpt cited by our court is little more than dicta.
"Op. cit. note 21 (italics added).
'In People v. Bender (note 8 supra) the court in interpreting the Cali-
fornia statute (which is the same as Montana') said:
"... such malice aforethought is not synonymous with the ele-
ments of deliberation and premeditation which must accompany
a homicide to characterize it as murder of the first degree."
7
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"instant" is to belie the very meaning of these words whose
fundamental connotation is quite the reverse. An instant is: "a
point in duration; a moment; especially an infinitesimal portion
of time.' ' To say that a person can premeditate and deliberate
in an instant is to say that one can give careful thought and
unhurried calculation (both of which imply several thoughts
and calculations) in the least amount of time necessary to ac-
commodate a single thought. It is to say that one can be un-
hurried with the speed of light. The only way that the thought
process before acting could be reduced or shortened from an
instant's duration would be to act without having so much as
a single thought precede the act. And, it would be unreason-
able to believe that any considerable amount of murders are com-
mitted which are unaccompanied by any mental processes at all.
On the reasoning of this case, it would seem, therefore, that any
act which is preceded by a single thought (and such thought
could come into being in the split fraction of a second before the
finger tightens on the trigger) is a premeditated act. There-
fore, as premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from
the facts and circumstances attending the killing, the differ-
ence between premeditation and deliberation, on the one hand,
and malice aforethought and bare intent on the other is so negli-
gible as to be, for all practical purposes, non-existent under the
rule of the Cates case.
As the courts have been prone to reiterate that the span of
time required for premeditation and deliberation need not be
of any pre-determined or specified time, they have been led into
construing this as meaning that the time may be reduced to an
"instant" and therefore reduced to nothingness. Would it not
be more in keeping with the letter and spirit of the statute to
require that premeditation and deliberation exist apart from,
and prior to, the immediate acts which cause death, and that
they be construed as a desire to take life, conceived in advance
of the act which is the fulfillment and expression of that desire?
The primary distinction to be made is that premeditation and
deliberation are elements distinct and apart from a mere legal
intention (express or implied) to take life.
On reviewing Montana decisions prior to the Cates case
which deal with this problem we find that the rule is not clearly
defined. The first case is that of Territory v. Johnson.' In
"0 p. oft. note 17 supra, (a) at p. 522, (b) at p. 464.
"Refer to note 7 supra.
8
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State v. Shafer the court in ruling on the trial court's instruc-
tion said:
"It is unnecessary to say this error, standing alone, would
be considered sufficient to authorize a reversal of this
case. Nevertheless, we cannot but disapprove of the in-
struction. It is a dangerous instruction, and so well cal-
culated to produce damage and prejudice, even when con-
sidered with all the instructions, that it is difficult to say
that it is not fatally erroneous."
The instruction in question was criticized specifically, in part,
for failure to mention malice aforethought in defining first de-
gree murder. However, the instruction contained the following
material on premeditation and deliberation which the Supreme
Court did not directly refer to but which presumably comes
within the broad scope of the criticism:
"But there need be no appreciable space of time between
the intention to kill and the act of killing. They may be
as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind ...
no matter how rapidly these acts of the mind may succeed
each other, or how quickly they may be followed by the
act of killing."
The next case was that of State v. Spotted Hawk' in which Jus-
tice Brantly held that the following instruction was a:
"Substantially correct statement of the law: . . . pre-
meditation is thought before hand for any length of time,
however short. Deliberation does not mean brooded over,
considered, reflected upon for a week, or day, or an hour,
but it means the intent to kill, executed by the party not
under the influence of a violent passion suddenly aroused
... but in the furtherance of a formed design to gratify
a feeling of revenge, or to accomplish some other purpose;
that is, it means in a cool state of blood, and is usually
characterized by what are termed 'cold-blooded murders'
such as proceed from deep malignity of heart, and are
prompted by motives of revenge or gain."
The last case prior to the Cates case which dealt with this prob-
lem was that of State v. LeDuc,' in which the court said:
"Complaint is made that the court erred in instructing
the jury, in effect, that deliberation and premeditation
may be formed in an instant. Since the defendant was
"(1898) 22 Mont. 17, 55 P. 526.
" (1898) 22 Mont. 67, 55 P. 1026.
"(1931) 89 Mont. 545, 300 P. 919.
9
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convicted of second degree murder only, it follows that
the jury must have concluded that there was no delibera-
tion, and hence he was not prejudiced by the court's in-
struction even though it be assumed that it was errone-
ous. "
It is to be noted that none of the Montana cases quoted above
could be construed as supporting the proposition that premedi-
tation and deliberation could be formed in the moment or instant
before the act is executed even though Territory v. Johnson and
State v. Spotted Hawk lean in that direction. State v. Shafer
and State v. LeDuc reflect an attitude in opposition to the "mo-
ment or instant" doctrine.
In summation it may be said that the court in the Cates case
enunciated a rule, in attempting to delimit premeditation and
deliberation as elements in first degree murder, which is not in
keeping with legislative intent or prior decisions nor with the
trend of decisions in other jurisdictions. The inference which
must be drawn from this decision is inconsistent and incom-
patible with the connotation of the words in question. Any at-
tempt to define "deliberate and premeditated" in terms of
"moment or instant" must of necessity be erroneous and more
in keeping with the antonyms of these words and must inevita-
bly obscure or eliminate the distinction between first and second
degree murder."
MALCOLM MAcCALMAN.
"For persuasive authority in support of the view expressed herein, it is
recommended that reference be made to Judge Pope's decision (note 9
supra) which is the leading and most recent case on this matter in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinion is very effectively
presented and is supplemented with ample footnotes and citations.
People v. Bender and People v. Hashaway (note 8 supra) are also
effective.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN TRESPASS ACTIONS WHEN
TITLE IS IN DISPUTE
The purpose of this article is to state the position of the
Montana Supreme Court on the question of whether or not a
court of equity will grant injunctions to enjoin trespasses to land
in cases of disputed title or right before determination of the
title or right in an action at law.
Until very recently courts have refused to enjoin a trepass
of any kind on real estate where it appeared from the pleadings
that the title to the land was in controversy. Three of the rea-
sons that appear most frequently in the decisions are: (1) It was
10
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